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Monetary policy is conducted primarily by the Bank of Japan in
cooperation with, or subject to the approval of, the Ministry of Fi-
nance. Commercial banking institutions in Japan are of various types.
Some are private, while others have been established and run by the
government; some are of a general nature, while others fulfill spe-
cialized functions. There are no separate discount houses of the
British type in Japan. The most important category of banks is that
known as "All Banks," which in terms of the amount of loans or the
size of deposits constitutes over 80 per cent of the commercial bank-
ing system. It consists of "City Banks," "Local Banks," "Trust Banks,"
and "Long-Term Credit Banks." Other categories of bank-type finan-
cial institutions are usually restricted in nature to rather narrow pur-
poses. They include institutions such as agricultural or industrial co-
operatives, credit associations, or investment corporations. Monetary
policy is concerned by and large, although not exclusively, with the
category of "All Banks"—where, in turn, it affects primarily the large
(and heavily concentrated) "City Banks."
The following are the actual or potential instruments at the dis-
posal of the Bank of Japan.
The Discount Rate. This is the major instrument used in the conduct
of monetary policy in Japan. The rate, or rates, apply to bills dis-
counted at the Bank of Japan and to advances against collateral from
the Bank to commercial banks (there are usually no overdrafts on the
Bank). These loans and discounts have been very important in Japan
not only as a means of bridging temporary gaps in banks' reserves, as
is customary elsewhere, but also as a major long-term (in effect) sourceJapan 35
ofliquidity for the banking system. Since, as will be mentioned later,
the government's budget has been approximately balanced for rea-
sonably long periods of time and open-market operations are of minor
importance, borrowing from the central bank is the only major source
of additional banking liquidity beside the accumulation of foreign
exchange reserves.
During most of the period, the Bank of Japan applied a system of
multiple discount rates. This was known as the "higher-interest-rate
system." Each bank was allocated a quota of loans from the Bank of
Japan, for which a low "basic" discount rate was in force. Above this
quota a higher rate—the "first penalty rate"—came into effect. Some-
times a second margin of Bank of Japan lending was established,
beyond which a still higher rate—the "second penalty rate"—was ap-
plied. Until August 1955, the basic discount rate was of practically
no significance for monetary policy: loans to all the banks consider-
ably exceeded their rationed quotas so that the first penalty rates,
and very often the second, were the relevant rates for marginal deci-
sions. In August 1955, the basic rate was increased considerably and
quotas were changed. From that date on, the basic rate became indeed
the usually meaningful figure. Higher penalty rates were still applied
even at later dates, but sparingly and in exceptional cases. In 1962,
the system of "higher interest rates" was abolished altogether.
In addition to influencing the amount of banks' borrowing through
changes in the discount rate, the Bank of Japan sometimes determines
actual ceilings of the amounts lent to each individual bank. This is
done in connection with rationing the credit granted by commercial
banks to their customers, a practice which will be mentioned shortly.
Reserve Requirements. The minimum-reserve requirement instrument
has been used only for the last few years and is still of minor signifi-
cance. Traditionally, commercial banks in Japan have held practically
no reserves beyond the cash used in day-to-day operations and small
deposits at the Bank of Japan required for interbank clearing. In 1957,
a law was passed which enabled the Bank of Japan to require the
banks to hold reserves, in the form of deposits at the Bank of Japan,
at a ratio not exceeding 10 per cent of the banks' deposits. In fact, re-
serve requirements were laid down for the first time in September
1959; the reserve ratios varied then according to the type of bank36 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
and the type of deposit, but they were all very low—around 1 per
cent of bank deposits. Minimum-reserve ratios were slightly raised
in October 1961 and again in December 1963; on the latter date, they
reached .5 per cent of time deposits and 3 per cent of sight deposits.
Apparently these increases, besides being slight, were not considered
as monetary measures intended to affect current monetary develop-
ments. As a rule, reserve requirements have thus not played any sig-
nificant role; although towards the end of 1965, a reduction of legal
reserve ratios (to virtually zero) was undertaken apparently as a means
of encouraging monetary expansion.
Open-Market Operations. The instrument of open-market operations,
as this term is normally understood, was not employed in Japan until
recent years. This has been attributed to a number of factors, chief of
which were the lack of a substantial organized capital market and a
low pegging of rates on government securities. Occasionally, the Bank
of Japan conducted a transaction in securities with a commercial bank,
but this was usually a bilateral, ad hoc transaction—with a specific
bank, in a specific security, and for a specified period. It was usually
motivated by the desire to bail the bank concerned out of a particular
difficulty or, conversely, to provide it with an outlet for a particularly
large accumulation of reserves. It was not used as an instrument of
over-all monetary policy.
Towards the end of the period (since 1963), open-market operations
became more significant in size and probably a more integral part of
over-all monetary policy; they are still, however, conducted in a bi-
lateral manner rather than strictly in the open market.
Direct Credit Control. The Bank of Japan has maintained, with vary-
ing degrees of severity, a direct control on the amount of credit granted
by each individual bank. In general, this has been an important in-
strument, in fact, the only significant tool of monetary policy aside
from discount rate manipulations. Naturally, the use of this control is
limited to periods when the banks wish to expand their loans more
than the Bank of Japan is willing to allow: It cannot be used to en-
courage an expansion of credit. By and large, therefore, this instru-
ment was relevant primarily when the monetary authorities were try-
ing to limit rather than encourage the expansion of credit.
The control system was adapted in its present form in 1954. It op-Japan 37
eratesnot on a formal, legal basis but through "moral suasion" by the
Bank of Japan and is known as the "discount-window operation," or
"official guidance." Despite its informal character, it is extensive and
rather detailed, particularly with regard to the few large "City Banks,"
and the "Long-Term Credit Banks." The Bank of Japan, in consulta-
tion with the banks, determines—at leastat certain periods—the
amount of credits that each can extend to the public in a month's
time; it sometimes follows the actual development of the banks' ac-
counts on a day-by-day basis. The Bank of Japan imposes its views
both by moral suasion and by pressure and sanctions, either threatened
or actually practiced. Sanctions include primarily a restriction of the
amount of Bank of Japan lending to the "delinquent" bank; or, in-
sofar as the banking system as a whole is concerned, a threat that dis-
count rates will be further increased if the "voluntary" control proves
to be ineffective.
FISCAL POLICY
The central government's budget consists of various accounts. The
most important among these is the general account, which encom-
passes most of the normal government activities, both of a current
and of a capital nature. In addition, there are about forty special ac-
counts. These have widely different functions, sources of income, and
types of expenditure. Some of them channel savings accumulated by
governmental saving institutions or by the social security system into
capital expenditures. A major "special account," from the standpoint
of size, is the foodstuffs control program, which is essentially a form
of subsidization of mass-consumed (and mass-produced) foodstuffs,
primarily rice. Another major special account is the foreign exchange
account. Strictly speaking, the latter is not a legitimate part of the
government's budget but a reflection of the movement of foreign ex-
change in the country's foreign transactions. In Japan, as frequently
in other countries with foreign exchange control, these transactions
are handled formally through the Treasury.
In principle, the government adheres to a balanced-budget policy,
and has indeed maintained a balanced budget over the period as a
whole and over any reasonably long fraction of it. Over short periods,
deficits or surpluses do show up. As a rule, the general account pro-
vides a surplus, which is transferred to some of the special accounts,
thus maintaining an over-all balance.38 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
The budgetary procedure in Japan apparently does not allow a
large measure of administrative flexibility. Supervision of the budg-
etary performance by the parliament (the Diet) is tight; rules are de-
termined in advance for the annual budget without leaving much lee-
way in actual execution.
The government does not, as a rule, borrow much from the public
(including the commercial banks). As mentioned earlier,interest
rates on government bonds are pegged at a low level, considerably be-
low comparable rates in the market. Likewise, the government does
not normally deal in short-term borrowing from (or lending to) for-
eign countries. Budgetary cash surpluses and deficits are expressed,
thus, mainly in changes in the government's indebtedness to the
Bank of Japan.' The Bank is not restricted by law in its extension
of credit to the government. It is, moreover, obligated to underwrite
the government's short-term securities. The government itself, on the
other hand, is legally denied the right to borrow at long term from
the Bank of Japan or to sell long-term securities to it. In effect, the
Bank of Japan's obligation to "underwrite" government securities im-
plies that it has to actually buy these securities, since the public would
not buy them under the conditions of their issuance; some securities
are resold, however, to governmental agencies. In the earlier years of
the period, a sizable portion of the government's indebtedness to the
Bank of Japan took the form of loans. These later declined, and from
about 1954 to 1961 loans to the government were nil or negligible in
comparison with the amount of government bonds at the Bank. Since
1962, however, loans—this time in the form of debentures rather than
advances—again became prominent.
2. Statistical Analysis
Data on changes in policy and target variables are presented in dia-
grammatic form in Chart 1. It appears that the series (not shown in
the chart) of balance-of-payments surpluses and deficits since 1958
gives almost the same impression, so far as turning points in directions
'The word "cash" should be emphasized. "Accrued" obligations of the public to
the government, or vice versa, are certainly widespread. It may also be mentioned
that from time to time the government becomes indebted to commercial banks due
to the latter's assumption of deferred government payments. For instance, food sub-
sidies may first be paid out by commercial banks, which are later reimbursed by the
government.Japan 39
ofmovements are concerned, as the series of gold and foreign ex-
change reserves. It was therefore decided to take the latter—with minor
modifications suggested by the former—as the indicator of balance-of-
payments disturbances. An upward movement of this magnitude is
considered an upward imbalance (that is, a balance-of-payments sur-
plus); a downward movement, an imbalance in the opposite direction.
The period under review is divided, accordingly, into subperiods of
upward disturbances, downward disturbances, or stability in the bal.
ance of payments. The classification of the period into subperiods ap-
pears in the first column of Table 1. In Chart 1, subperiods of down-
ward disturbances are shaded by diagonal lines, subperiods of stability
are shaded gray, and subperiods of upward disturbances are not shaded.
The remaining columns of Table 1 show the over-all trend of each
of the policy variables considered during each subperiod of disturb-
ance. For convenience of observation and exposition, each such move-
ment is given a sign. It is marked by a plus sign when the movement
of the variable complies with the assumption that the variable is
manipulated in the direction required for balance-of-payments ad-
justment (for brevity, this will be referred to as an "adjusting direc-
tion"), by a minus sign when the variable moves in a direction opposite
to that which balance-of-payments adjustment would require, and by
an asterisk when the variable does not move, although balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment would have justified an upward or a downward
movement.2 It should be clear, in line with the discussion in the for-
2 Similar use of plus and minus signs, in a Context limited to the study of a single
policy variable (the central bank's domestic assets), was made by Nurkse and by
Bloomfield in their aforementioned studies. See Nurkse, International Currency
Experience, pp. 68—70, and Bloomfield, Monetary Policy under the Gold Standard,
pp. 47—51.
It should be emphasized—indeed, this point could not be overstressed—that the use
of such signs in the present study (as, I believe, in its predecessors) does not have any
normative connotation. Giving, for instance, a plus mark to a certain movement does
by no means indicate that this movement is considered desirable in general, or by
some particular yardstick, or that a different policy would be somehow less desirable.
As was stated in the preceding chapters, the present study does not attempt to pass
judgment on the appropriateness of policies pursued by various countries at various
times. It does not intend to discuss the merits of various policy targets; and it does
not purport to examine the issue—nor, a fortiori, to reach conclusions about it—of
the adequacy of certain policy instruments for given policy targets. The present study
is viewed as merely a necessary step on the road for such inquiries. Thus, if any con-
venient "neutral" symbols could be used for the purpose of identification, they would
have been adopted. The plus and minus signs were selected because no other symbols
are completely neutral, while these signs enjoy the advantages of having been used



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.42 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
mer chapter, that at this stage each variable is examined by itself, and
not yet as part of the general pattern; and is judged according as it
moves in an "adjusting" direction or not.
The stage is thus set for the observation of policy variables. If a
variable moves consistently in the direction conforming to the need
for balance-of-payments adjustment,it would be tentatively con-
cluded that manipulation of this variable was indeed motivated by
the purpose of adjustment. If no such consistent behavior is found—
and, a fortiori, when a variable consistently behaves in the opposite
fashion—it must be concluded that the variable under consideration
did not serve as a tool of balance-of-payments adjustment.
Looking, first, at the discount rate (column 2 of Table 1), it is im-
mediately apparent that this variable moved consistently—indeed,
with no exception—in an adjusting direction: the rate was raised when
a downward disturbance in the balance of payments took place, and
lowered in opposite instances. The evidence thus suggests the tenta-
tive conclusion that discount rate policy was used by the Bank of
Japan as an instrument of balance-of-payments adjustment.8
Next, in column 3 of Table 1, Bank of Japan lending to commercial
banks is examined. Here a consistent pattern again appears, but in the
opposite direction. These loans move regularly upward at times of a
downward disturbance in the balance of payments, and vice versa;
these are, of course, movements which would augment disturbances
rather than correct them. In the few exceptions to this pattern the vari-
able in question merely did not move, instead of moving in a disadjust-
ing direction; only in one instance, the upward disturbance of 1950,
did the variable actually move in a way consistent with balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment.
The fact that commercial bank borrowing from the central bank
increased, as a rule, when the discount rate was raised and diminished
when the rate was lowered may seem somewhat surprising. This rela-
tionship may be explained, however, in the light of concurrent
changes in other variables. I will come back to this relationship after
examining the other related variables.
8Itshould be recalled that data on discount rate variations are relevant, so far as
the "basic" rate is concerned, only from August 1955 onward. Partial information on
the manipulation of the "penalty rates" indicates, however, that discount rate varia-
tions were employed in an adjusting direction also during the downward disturbance
of the first half of 1954 and the following upward disturbance of mid-1954 to the end
of 1955.Japan 43
Theother component of the Bank of Japan's domestic claims is its
net claims on the government. Unfortunately, the amount of such
claims as they appear in the data is misleading, because the size of
these claims is heavily affected, in a biased way, by foreign exchange
movements. A decline in foreign exchange reserves, for instance, would
usually, but not necessarily always, mean a (net) sale of foreign ex-
change (not drawn, most often, from the Bank) by the government's
foreign exchange fund to the public. This, in turn, would increase the
government's deposits at the Bank, or be used to redeem government
debt to the Bank, thus reducing the government's net indebtedness to
the Bank. An impression of a movement in an adjusting direction
may thereby be created. But, in fact, the adjusting impact is that of
the movement of foreign exchange itself, and recording its reflection
in the government's accounts at the Bank would amount to double
counting.4
In an indirect way, however, some conception of this variable can
be gained by looking at the movements of the budgetary balance. As
will be recalled, the government conducts its financial transactions
(other than those in foreign exchange) primarily with the Bank of
Japan rather than with the public or with commercial banks. Move-
ments of the variable under consideration are, thus, primarily the
mirror reflection of the government's cash balance. It will be observed
later that this balance does not show a consistent reaction to imbal-
ances of payments throughout the period and during the 1950's it may
be regarded as having been changed most often in a disadjusting di-
rection.
Due to the deficiency of the data on the Bank's net claims on the
government, for the purpose at hand, the recorded magnitude of total
domestic assets of the Bank may also be biased. However, it is not dif-
ficult, perhaps, to guess what an unbiased record would have shown.
The budgetary balance, as has just been mentioned, usually did not
tend to move in a way which would offset the movements of the Bank's
claims on commercial banks: on the contrary, the two moved most
often together, in a disadjusting direction. It may therefore be quite
safely assumed that had bias-free data on the Bank's total domestic
claims existed, they would have shown consistent movements in a dis-
adjusting direction. Moreover, even without the necessary correction
4 From published sources, there does not seem to be a reliable way of separating the
effect of the government's foreign exchange transactions from its other transactions.44 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
(that is, including movements biased in an adjusting direction), the
data give the same indication. This is shown in column 4 of Table 1,
in which the frequency of movements in a disadjusting direction ap-
pears to be only slightly less than in column 3. This finding about the
direction of changes in the central bank's domestic assets is similar in
principle to those suggested by Nurkse and Bloomfield.5
Loans of commercial banks to the public are represented in column
5 of Table 1. They increased continuously at a rather fast pace
throughout the period under review, and the rate of increase appears
to be rather stable over the subperiods of balance-of-payments dis-
turbances. The rate does not seem to vary much among these periods;
in the few instances where it does, the variations show no consistent
tendency either in the adjusting direction or in its opposite.
Money supply, on the other hand, which may be observed in col-
umn 6, does seem to react to balance-of-payments disturbances in an
adjusting direction, at least from the beginning of 1954. From that
period on, the rate of increase in money supply most of the time was
less during periods of downward disturbances in the balance of pay-
ments, and greater during periods of upward disturbances.
Turning to the fiscal variables, it appears much more difficult to
distinguish any consistent reaction to balance-of-payments disturb-
ances. Both government revenues and expenditures show a clear long-
term expansionary trend, as should be expected. However, the rate of
increase, although not quite stable, does not seem to be associated
with balance-of-payments fluctuations.6 The budgetary cash balance,
or the government's excess demand, is represented in column 7 of Ta-
ble 1.7 It appears that, for the period as a whole, no clear-cut pattern
may be distinguished. However, during the 1950's, movements of the
balance in a disadjusting direction do seem to dominate.
Let us now turn from the examination of subperiods of disturbances
See, again, Nurkse, International Currency Experience, and Bloomfield, Monetary
Policy.
6Tosave space, these variables are not shown in Table 1 and in Chart 1.
7Revenuesand expenditures, and thus the budgetary balance, are compiled net of
the foreign exchange account of the budget. The latter, as has been pointed out
earlier, does not form a part of the government's excess demand; its inclusion would
not only have distorted the budgetary accounts for the purpose on hand but also
clearly introduced a bias in favor of movements in an adjusting direction.
From 1958 on, the budget is presented in this way in the source (International
Financial Statistics). For earlier years, the exclusion of revenues and expenditures in
the foreign exchange account was done by us.Japan 45
TABLE2
Japan: Reference Dates of Cycles
of Foreign Exchange Reserves
Cycle Trough Peak Trough
1951—54 II1951 III1952 II1954
1954—57 II1954 IV1956 III1957
1957—61 III1957 II1961 IV1961
1961—64 IV1961 IV1963 III1964
to the application of reference cycle analysis.8 In principle, the two
methods should yield roughly the same indications, since they are
rather similar: the cycle contains one subperiod of upward disturb-
ance and one of downward disturbance—although it may also contain
parts of subperiods of stability. However, using both methods may
help to suggest patterns; and findings which are fully supported by
both may deserve greater confidence. The cycle, in the present con-
texts is that of foreign exchange reserves—which indeed manifest, as
may be observed from Chart 1, rather clear cyclical movements. The
reference dates will be determined by the turning points of these
cycles, which will be defined from trough to trough. An expansionary
phase (from trough to peak) will thus be the phase of the cycle in
which foreign exchange reserves rise; and the contractionary phase—
its opposite. The reference dates are shown in Table 2.
The positions of the policy variables during the reference-cycle
stages are presented in Chart 2. In part A, it may be seen that the
discount rate moves almost invariably in a consistent pattern—it falls
when foreign exchange reserves rise (that is, along the stages from
trough to peak), and rises when reserves fall. Bank of Japan claims
on the public (i.e., on commercial banks), represented in part B, also
follow a generally consistent pattern—falling during the expansionary
phase of the cycle, and rising during the contraction. Total domestic
assets of the Bank of Japan, shown in part C, reveal a weaker pat-
tern:during the expansionary phase, their level appears, as a rule,
8See,again, Burns and Mitchell, Measuring Business Cycles, Chapter 2.
9But,here, the distorting effect of the inclusion of foreign exchange transactions
of the government should be recalled.46 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
CHART 2
Japan: Patterns of Policy Variables
During Balance-of-Payments Cycles
A B
Discount Rate Bank of Japan
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tobe either falling or rising less fast than during the contractionary
phase.
Commercial bank lending to the public, shown in part D, shows a
probably slight dependence on the stage of the foreign exchange re-
serves cycle. Only during the cycle of II 1954—Ill 1957 does this mani-
fest itself as clear-cut cyclical behavior, namely, an increase in the
rate of expansion of credit when reserves rise, and a reduction of
this rate when reserves fall. A similar but much weaker pattern ap-
pears also during the cycle of IV 1961—Ill 1964. It is thus apparent
that this variable did occasionally respond in an adjusting direction,
but that such response was far from being a general rule.
The rate of increase of money supply, drawn in part E, appears as
a rule to be higher during the expansionary phase than during the
subsequent contraction. This observation conforms, of course, to the
tentative conclusion reached earlier. However, the pattern of behavior
of this variable throughout each of these two phases is rather weak.
Only once, in the 1957—6 1 cycle, does a neat, perfect pattern appear—
of a gradual rise during the expansion, and a gradual decline during
the contraction. In the 1954—57 cycle this pattern is approached,
though not perfectly matched, while in the other two cycles, no such
patterns can be found at all.
The positions of the budgetary balance, represented in part F, do
not reveal any consistent pattern. No regular contrast appears, either
with regard to the sign of the balance (surplus or deficit) or its form
of movement between stages of rising and of falling foreign exchange
reserves. This evidence tends to indicate that budgetary policy was
not directed, as a rule, toward adjusting balance-of-payments dis-
turbances.
Before trying to interpret these findings, we must ask whether the
policy measures which were identified by this analysis as being taken
to adjust balance-of-payments disturbances, may not in fact be related
to other economic targets, movements of which happened to be asso-
ciated in a consistent manner with balance-of-payments disturbances.
We turn now to the examination of this possibility.
As will be recalled, alternative competing targets will be repre-
sented in the study by three variables: the rate of unemployment, the
rate (and direction) of price changes, and the rate (and direction) of
changes in industrial production. The unemployment rate, at least50 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
as it appears in available data, has been very low throughout the pe-
riod under consideration. It is therefore assumed here, without further
confirmation, that these changes could not, as a rule, have explained
the policy measures taken. Even if this assumption is not fully war-
ranted, it should be realized that the more significant changes in un-
employment, at least, would not disappear from the analysis alto-
gether, since these changes must be reflected in the rate of change of in-
dustrial production.
Two variables, standing for two targets, thus are left. One is the
rate of change of the price level; the other, the rate of change in in-
dustrial production. Since the index of wholesale prices and the cost
of living index (in Tokyo) give substantially the same indications of
price movements, the latter index only will be used to represent this
variable. The target of maintaining a stable price level will be consid-
ered violated here not when prices move, since prices moved upward
almost continuously, but when their movement deviates from the
price level's short-term trend (which is measured, in turn, by a three-
year moving average).
The question posed is, thus, whether the manipulations of the dis-
count rate and the budgetary balance could not be explained by either
the wish to maintain a stable (movement of) price level or the wish to
achieve a high rate of expansion of industrial production, rather than
by the requirements of balance-of-payments adjustment. Again, more
than one method will be used to test this hypothesis.
Take first the discount rate. In Table 3, each change in this variable
is shown for the period from 1957 onward (the change in early 1957
being the first since August 1955 when the "basic" discount rate be-
came meaningful). The direction of change of each of the three alter-
native target variables—foreign exchange reserves, the price level, and
industrial production—is examined in each quarter in which the dis-
count rate moved. If the direction of the latter movement is consistent
with the assumption that it was made in order to adjust a certain tar-
get variable, in view of the concurrent change in that variable, the
latter is given a plus sign for that quarter; if the change in the discount
rate is in the opposite direction, the variable is assigned a minus. It
is thus possible to get an impression at a glance of whether an assump-
tion that manipulation of the discount rate was intended to serve a
certain target is justified or, rather, not contradicted, by the data.Japan 51
TABLE3
Japan:Changes in the Discount Rate and Movements of Policy Targets
•Price Level Industrial
Foreign (Cost of Living Production
Discount ExchangeIndex) Compared (rate of
Rate Reserves with Trend change)
Quarter (1) (2) (3) (4)
I 1957 raised + fall * stable + increases
II 1957 raised + fall ± rises + increases
II 1958 lowered + rise — rises + declines
III 1958 lowered + rise + falls * stable
I 1959 lowered + rise + falls — increases
IV 1959 raised — rise + rises + increases
III 1960 lowered + rise — rises * stable
I 1961 lowered + rise — rises — increases
III 1961 raised + fall + rises + increases
IV 1962 lowered + rise * stable + declines
I 1963 lowered + rise — rises * stable
II 1963 lowered + rise — rises — increases
I 1964 raised + fall — falls + increases
I 1965 lowered + rise — rises + declines
II 1965 lowered — fall — rises + declines
Note: +Thechange in the target variable would justify the direction of change in the
discount rate.
—Thechange in the target variable would justify the opposite direction.
*Thechange in the target variable would call for no change in the discount
rate.
It appears immediately that the movements of the discount rate are
consistent with the assumption that this instrument was used for bal-
ance-of-payments adjustment—not a surprising finding, of course, at
this stage of the analysis since a similar finding was the starting point
of the present test. Table 3 also shows, however, that changes in the
discount rate are not, as a rule, compatible with the assumption that
they were intended to maintain a stable rate of change in the price
level. This assumption is, indeed, so obviously contradicted by the
data that it will not be subject here to further investigation. No such
clear-cut indication is provided about the rate of expansion of indus-
trial production. The assumption that discount rate policy was moti-
vated by a desire to maintain stability on a high level in this rate ap-52 Balance-of-PaymentsAdjustment Policies
pears to be refuted on a number of occasions, but not often enough
to be dismissed on this evidence.
Additional evidence is provided, however, in Table 4 and Chart 3.
In Table 4, subperiods of balance-of-payments disturbances serve
again as units of observation. It may be seen immediately that the
movements of the discount rate in each of these subperiods—with not
a single exception—could be explained by a wish to correct imbalances
of payments, but not by the desire to maintain a high rate of expan-
sion in production. In the reference cycle analysis shown in Chart 3,
the reference dates are determined by cycles in the rate of change of
industrial production. The trough is defined as the point at which this
rate is lowest (in rare cases it is even negative), and the peak as where
TABLE 4
Japan: The Discount Rate and Industrial Production
During Subperiods of Disturbances
Foreign Industrial
Exchange Production Discount
Reserves (rate of change) Rate
Subperiod (1) (2) (3)
II—IV 1950 rise n.a. a
IV 1950—lI 1951 fall n.a. a
111951—Ill 1952 rise declines slightly a
III 1952—lI 1953 fall stable a
II—IV 1953 stableincreases slightly a
IV 1953—Il 1954 fall declines slightly a
II 1954—IV 1955 rise stable a
IV 1955—IV 1956 stableincreases + stable
IV 1956—Ill 1957 fall no trend + raised
III 1957—lI 1961 rise no trend + reduced considerably
II—IV 1961 fall stable + raised
IV 196 1—Il 1963 rise declines and + reduced considerably
then increases
II—IV 1963 stableincreases + stable
IV 1963—Il 1964 fall stable + raised
Note: + The policy variable changes in the direction required for balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment; no change would bejustified by the movement of industrial produc-
tion.
a not applicable.Japan 53
CHART
Japan: Pattern of the Discount Rate
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it is highest. It appears that a largely consistent pattern is displayed:
in the trough, the discount rate is high; it is lowered towards the
peak, when the rate is lowest, and raised again during the movement
from peak to trough. However, this, of course, is the exact opposite of'
what a policy intended to lead to a high rate of expansion would have
required. The actual policy followed reduced the discount rate—an
expansionary measure—when the rate of expansion of production was
highest, and raised the discount rate when expansion slowed down,
that is, exactly when a fall of the discount rate would have been
called for.'° This evidence seems to provide another strong basis for
10 The inverse relationship between the discount rate and the expansion of in-
dustrial production could, on the other hand, be explained by the opposite causal
connection; namely, high interest rates lead to contractions, and low rates to expan-
sions. An examination of the validity of such a statement, in general or in the specific
case of Japan, is clearly beyond the scope of the present study.54 Balance-of-PaymentsAdjustment Policies
rejecting the assumption that discount rate policy was intended to pro-
mote a high rate of growth. The assumption, on the other hand, that
this policy was manipulated in the interests of balance-of-payments
adjustment is strongly supported by these tests.
Table 5 describes the two alternative target variables—foreign ex-
change reserves and industrial production—during periods in which
the budget displayed clearly either surpluses or deficits. It may be seen,
TABLE 5
Japan: The Budgetary Balance and Movements of Policy Targets
Industrial
Foreign Production
Budgetary Exchange (rate of
Balance Reserves increase)
Period (1) (2) (3)
IV1950—Il 1951 surplus * stable na.
IV1953—I 1955 deficit * notrend + low
II1955—I 1957 surplus — rise + high
II1960—TV 1961 surplus * notrend * normal
III1962—Ill 1963 deficit + rise + low
Note: See Table 3forexplanation of symbols.
from column 2, that the assumption that budgetary policy was used
to adjust balance-of-payments disturbances could not be sustained by
this evidence: it is supported by only a single episode—that of the
budgetary deficit of III 1962—Ill 1963—out of the five listed in Table
5. The alternative assumption, that budgetary policy was used to serve
the target of a high rate of expansion of industrial production, fares
much better: it is supported by three episodes (out of four), and clearly
rejected by none.
3. Sumnary and Interpretation
From all the evidence presented, it appears that budgetary policy in
Japan did not usually serve as an instrument for adjusting balance-of-
payments disequilibria. It seems possible that, insofar as budgetary
policy was regarded as a tool to be used in the pursuance of economicJapan 55
policy,it was allocated to the target of preserving a high rate of ex-
pansion of economic activity.
Monetary developments, on the other hand, definitely appear to
respond to the movements of the balance of payments, and monetary
policy may be viewed as being geared to the needs of balance-of-pay-
ments adjustment. Imbalances of payments lead to changes in mone-
tary variables in accordance with the following typical pattern.
In a downward disturbance, that is, a downward tendency of for-
eign exchange reserves, the Bank of Japan invariably reacts by rais-
ing the discount rate. From the information available, it also seems
likely that the Bank would use "moral suasion," or "discount-window
guidance," in an effort to restrict the amount of credit extended by
commercial banks to their customers. At the same time, however, the
change in the public's demand for this credit would be expected to
move in the opposite direction. This is a period in which the amount
of liquidity available to the economy from the (net) acquisition of
foreign exchange reserves is falling, that is, the loss of reserves tends
to diminish the amount of liquid means. As a result, demand for
bank credit by the public must rise. In the end, the rate of credit ex-
pansion may tend to show a slight tendency to fall during downward
disturbances, although this tendency is far from being consistent. This
seems to be an indication that the aforementioned restrictions on the
supply of credit are effective. To what extent this may be attributed
to cost restrictions (through the increase of the discount rate), or how
much of it may be due to direct quantitative restrictions ("window
guidance"), is impossible to tell on the basis of available informationll
But even when the rate of credit expansion does fall, this tendency
11 The increase in the discount rate would act as a cost restriction in either of two
ways. If the rates charged by banks on loans to their customers remain unchanged,
the increased cost incurred by the banks themselves on their borrowing from the
central bank would act as a deterrent to their borrowing and relending (or lending
and rediscounting). If, on the other hand, the banks "pass on" the increase in their
cost by raising the interest rates charged on their lending, the amount of credit
demanded by the public should tend to decline. As a rule, the former channel was
probably more important in the Japanese case. The rates charged by banks were
subject to legal ceilings; usually, the rates found in effect were the ceiling rates.
Thus, changes in the discount rate were not transformed into changes in the various
rates charged by the banks, but acted through the reduction of profitability of the
banks' lending. This, in turn, should presumably lead the banks, in such a time, to
increase the proportion of favored, less risky loans in their total lending. The special
difficulties realized in fact by Japan's small business sector during such periods may
be an indication that this indeed was the process.56 Balance-of-Payments Adjustment Policies
is only slight. To maintain the expansion of credit, commercial banks
must take some compensatory action with regard to their own liquidity
or reserves. Bank liquidity is affected by three major factors (disre-
garding the possibility of changes in the public's desired currency
ratio): changes in the amount of foreign exchange reserves, changes
in the amount of central bank lending to the government, and
changes in central bank lending to the commercial banks themselves.
Information about the second factor is deficient; but it does not seem
likely that it operates with enough force to even nearly offset the oper-
ation of the first factor, namely, changes in foreign exchange reserves.
Thus, in order to resist the downward pressure on their liquidity the
banks resort to increased borrowing from the central bank. They do
so despite the increased cost of this borrowing—presumably, as has
been explained, as a result of increased demand by the public for
bank credit.12
Money supply, in its turn, is affected by three major factors (dis-
regarding the possibility of a change in the proportion of liquid as-
sets held by the public in the form of assets not defined as money, such
as time deposits). These are the changes in foreign exchange reserves,
in central bank (net) lending to the government, and in the amount of
bank lending (in all forms) to the public. A downward disturbance, as
defined here, consists of a fall in foreign exchange reserves. Central
bank lending to the government may, at most, only partly offset this
movement; whereas the third component—bank lending to the public
—tends somewhat to reinforce it. The net result is that, when foreign
exchange reserves fall, the amount of money (more precisely, in the
case of Japan, the rate of expansion of this amount) tends to fall too.
In a period of an upward disturbance, this pattern is reversed; and
Bank of Japan lending to the government most often tends to in-
crease. Commercial banks use the added liquidity acquired by them
12Thetendency of commercial banks to increase their borrowing from the central
bank when they suffer a loss of liquidity due to a decline of foreign exchange
reserves, and, conversely, to repay debts to the central bank when additional liquidity
is acquired through the rise of foreign exchange reserves, was recognized and empha-
sized in Nurkse's classic study, International Currency Experience, especially p. 70.
Nurkse offered this tendency, which he termed "automatic neutralization," as a
partial explanation of his finding that the "rules of the game" were not observed
during the interwar period. Bloomfield (Monetary Policy Under the International
Gold Standard, pp. 50—51) used it in a similar way in his analysis of the pre-1914
gold standard. But see the discussion of this topic in Chapter 2 of the present study.Japan 57
notto increase the rate of expansion of their lending to the public
but to repay debts to the Bank of Japan—despite the fall in the latter's
discount rate, which is a practically invariable consequence in this
situation. The rate of expansion of bank credit remains stable, or
tends to rise, and the rate of expansion of money supply accelerates.
To sum up: the discount rate and the rate of expansion of money
supply respond consistently to imbalance of payments. At times of
downward disturbances, the discount rate is raised, and the money sup-
ply falls, whereas the opposite tendencies are manifested in episodes
of upward disturbances. These, of course, are tendencies consistent
with the assumption that monetary policy was used to adjust the bal-
ance of payments.